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EXTENSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES TO
DEVELOPER-VENDORS OF COMPLETED
NEW HOMES
Since the post-war housing boom, American courts and commen-
tators have been wrestling with difficulties in real estate transactions
caused by the doctrine of caveat emptor. While uniform codes have
replaced this ancient doctrine in the sales of moveables,' until recently it
remained virtually unchanged in the sale of realty.2 Faced with the
hardships this imposed upon the homeowner, making one of the maj or
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 (merchantability), § 2-315 (fitness for particular
purpose) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]; cf. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 15.
2. The classic work on caveat emptor ("let the buyer beware") is Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931). "The expression first appeared in print
in 1534, and the doctrine became firmly established in the common law during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It apparently gained its strongest foothold among
traders in England's small rural markets ... " Comment, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Real
Property - Time for a Reappraisal, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 484 (1968). A "sale of realty" was
synonymous with the transfer of a legal interest in land "with appurtenances," and with
the drawing up of the deed, any implied or oral covenants concerning the quality of the
structure were extinguished (barring fraud or misrepresentation). See generally Green v.
Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622-27, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-75, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-11
(1974).
Caveat emptor, however, did not adversely affect the typical buyer of a new house
during the nineteenth century. In those days, after all, the home-owner-to-be was
commonly a middle-class fellow who purchased his own lot of land and then
retained an architect to design a home for him. Once the plans were ready the
landowner hired a contractor who built a house according to the plans. Quality
control was assured because the builder was paid in stages .... If the house did
happen to collapse, the homeowner had a choice of lawsuits to recoup his losses:
either the plans were defective, in which case the architect had been negligent, or the
building job had not been workmanlike, in which case the contractor was
liable....
After World War II, however, the building industry underwent a revolution. It
became common for the builder to sell the house and land together in a package
deal.
Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835, 837 (1967). There was a great demand for new housing, and it was supplied in
vast quantities by "builder-vendors." The poor quality of some of these units provided the
impetus to the courts for re-examining the doctrine of caveat emptor. The annual value of
this new private residential construction rose from under $2 billion in 1945 to $15 billion
in 1950. Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty - Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14
VAND. L. REv. 541, 542 & n.6 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Bearman]. In 1973, that figure
stood at $57.604 billion. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT CONSTRUCTION REPORTS,
VALUE OF NEW CONSTRUCTIoN PUT IN PLACE C30 (1974).
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purchases of his life, 3 courts began a case-by-case assault upon the rule.'
The doctrine of implied warranty emerged as one method by which
courts fulfilled the reasonable expectations of the buyer.5 The Supreme
Court of California recently aligned itself with a growing minority of
jurisdictions that have found an implied warranty of reasonable
workmanship and habitability in the sale of completed new homes.
In Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co.6 defendant developer
entered into a series of agreements in 1960 and 1961 with a general
contractor for the construction of a number of apartment buildings in
San Jose. Upon completion of each, Saxe & Yolles took possession,
renting them until they were sold. In 1963 defendant contracted with
plaintiffs for the sale of five of the buildings. Plaintiffs discovered that
Saxe & Yolles had ordered material changes during the construction of
the apartments which resulted in structural defects in several buildings. 7
Plaintiffs, however, gave defendant no notice of these defects until
January 1967, just before suit was filed.
The trial court found that plaintiffs had not shown fraud or
misrepresentation, and that there were no implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness for purpose. 8 The district court of appeals
reversed and allowed recovery, finding that California decisions
evidenced "a trend toward extension of the kinds of contracts in which
the law will imply warranties and a trend toward imposing liability
3. See Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchase of a Defective Home, 49J.
URBAN L. 533, 551-52 (1971).
4..See Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat Venditor, 24 ARK. L. REv. 245
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Young 8c Harper].
5. "The issue should be whether the buyer got what he bargained for." Haskell, The
Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633, 649
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Haskell]. See generally 7 S. WILLlsTON, CONTRACTS § 926A (3d
ed. 1963).
6. 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
7. Saxe 8c Yolles had ordered the use of undersized wooden beams and the substitution of
concrete for magnesite on the patio decks causing structural defects which included
buckling ceilings, sticking patio doors, and improper drainage on patio decks. Id. at 376-
77, 525 P.2d at 89-90, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50. The defendants maintained (and the courts
agreed) that they had no actual knowledge of these defects. Brief for Defendant at 5-6,
Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974). If
fraud or deceit had been proven, there would have been no concern with caveat emptor.
8. Brief for Defendant, supra note 7, at 6-7. The suit was brought more than three but less
than four years after discovery of the damage. This meant that California's real property
tort (negligence or strict liability) statute had run; thus, possibly the easiest route to
recovery was gone. See CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 338(2) (Deering 1972). Plaintiffs were forced
to rely on the four years statute for instruments in writing. Id. § 337(1).
[Vol. 11:257
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upon builder-sellers of real property." 9 The state supreme court
unanimously affirmed the finding of an implied warranty but denied
recovery because plaintiffs had failed to notify defendants and enable
them to repair.10 After examining the practicalities of the housing
market and national trends, the court concluded that "builders and
sellers of new construction should be held to what is impliedly
represented - that the completed structure was designed and con-
structed in a reasonably workmanlike manner."'"
The first indication that courts would be willing to reconsider their
historic position on caveat emptor in the sale of housing appeared in the
English case of Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates. 2 Plaintiff had purchased
a home in the course of construction which, upon completion, was
found to contain structural flaws. The court concluded that when a
buyer purchases a house in the course of construction, he relies on the
builder to complete the dwelling in a workmanlike manner, while the
purchaser of a completed home can inspect the finished product. This
distinction has been the subject of extensive criticism and commentary,
and has troubled American courts for some time. 3 Few people are adept
9. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 174, 177 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973), vacated,
12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
10. 12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652; see notes 51, 53 infra.
11. 12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
12. [1931] 2 K.B. 113, 120-21.
13. A history of the secondary works on warranties and home construction is a story in
itself. For years writers, both professional and student, encouraged the courts to abandon
their reluctance to impose warranties on the sale of completed homes. One early article
anticipated the demise of caveat emptor but had to admit that the prevailing rule was
otherwise. Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose,
37 MINN. L. REv. 108, 125 (1953). In 1961 a lengthy and important articleappeared that was
forced to admit the same but outlined several means by which courts had circuitously
granted recovery, and how such theories could be expanded in the future. A model
ordinance was even included. Bearman, supra note 2, at 543,576-79; see note 59 infra. This
article figured prominently in the first extension of warranties tocompleted home buyers.
See notes 22-23 and accompanying text infra. Other observations on the evolution of the
implied warranty include Bixby, supra note 3, at 560-63; Haskell, supra note 5, at 640-41;
Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability (pt. II), 47 CHi-KENT L. REv. 1,27-46 (1970); Roberts,
supra note 2, at 838; Young 8: Harper, supra note 4, at 252; Comment, Caveat Emptor in
Sales of Real Property - A Time for Reappraisal, 10 ARIz. L. REv. 484 (1968); Note,
Builder-Vendor Liability for Construction Defects in Houses, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 369(1972);
Note, Detvelopments in Actions for Breach of Implied Warranties of Habitability in the
Sale of Neu, Houses, IOTusA L.J. 445(1975); Note, Implied Warranties in the Sale of New
Houses, 26 U. Pr-r. L. REV. 862 (1965); 24 ALA. L. REV. 332 (1972); 43 DENVER L.J. 379
(1966); 22 DE PAUL L. REv. 510(1972); 38 Mo. L. REV. 315(1973); 44 N.C.L. REv. 236(1965);
17 TEM!PLE L.Q. 172 (1973); 34 U. Pir. L. REv. 458 (1973); 45 WASH. L. REV. 670 (1970).
Finally in 1974 one author concluded that "an enlightened court, presented with a cogent
1976]
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at technical examination of buildings, and many (if not most) flaws are
hidden upon completion. Usually no less reliance or greater care in
construction occurs in post-completion sales than in the prior instances.
In either case the expectation is the same: the buyer contemplates a
dwelling fit for the permanent habitation of his family. Express
warranties are rarely given, expensive, and impractical for most buyers
to negotiate. Inevitably the buyer is forced to rely on the skills of the
seller.t4
Most courts, including California's, have allowed a limited degree of
protection to buyers under negligence standards.' 5 If the builder
assertion of an implied warranty would, in all likelihood, abolish the rule of caveat
emptor." McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New-House Construction Revisited, 3
REAL ESTATE L.J. 136, 141 (1974).
14. For exhaustive summaries of these arguments see Bearman, supra note 2, at 545-46;
Haskell, supra note 5, at 641-43. See also note 32 infra. On occasion, this reliance has been
exploited by the unscrupulous seller. See Bixby, Implied Warranty of Habitability: New
Right for Home Buyers, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 468 & n.1 (1972) (investigations of FHA
programs).
The policy rationale for abolishing caveat emptor has consistently centered on the
unsophisticated buyer. But what of the corporate purchaser? If the corporation has no
special skill in building, or if there were latent defects which even the most astute buyer
could not have discovered, there seems to be no reason why the builder-vendor should not
warrant that he has done a reasonably proficient job. Cf. Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen
Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co., 274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622 (1966) (implied warranty
in favor of cooperative for improper erection of a grain elevator). The understanding
between the parties is basically the same as that between the single family home buyer and
builder. Perhaps, though, the large corporation should be required to proficiently inspect
the building, much as an architect would do periodically for the company if the building is
erected ab initio. Consider also whether a court should require the corporate buyer to have
obtained an express warranty in view of its enhanced bargaining position.
Arguments in support of caveat emptor primarily center around fears of unlimited
liability and a flood of litigation, despite the fact that no one has suggested that builders
should become absolute insurers. Some courts, anachronistically, still treat the sale as one
of land "with appurtenances," and caveat emptor is still the rule in sales of raw land. See
Haskell, supra note 5, at 641-42. For cases demonstrating the application of caveat emptor
see Voight v. Ott, 86 Ariz. 128,341 P.2d 923 (1959); Whiten v. Orr Constr. Co., 109 Ga. App.
267, 136 S.E.2d 136 (1964); Thomas v. Cryer, 251 Md. 725, 248 A.2d 795 (1969); Allen v.
Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395,243 A.2d 515 (1968); Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super.
293, 134 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957); Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594
(1966).
15. E.g., Murphy v. Sheftel, 121 Cal. App. 533,9 P.2d 568 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932), in which
an implied warranty of fitness sanctioning recision was denied a purchaser of nearly
completed apartment buildings, but recovery on the contract for negligently caused
structural damage was allowed. See note 28 infra. For a time, a builder-vendor's liability
qua vendor regarding torts was illustrated by Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66
(1925), which held that caveat emptor precluded recovery for personal injury due to defects
known but not disclosed. Any warranty was held to have been extinguished by the passing
of the deed. The harshness of this rule had never fully applied in suits against builder-
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negligently failed to complete the structure in a workmanlike manner or
failed to warn of latent defects he knew or should have known of by
exercising due care, the purchasercould recover damages.16 The builder-
vendor has also been held accountable under strict liability for severe
defects in his product causing personal or property injuries to either first
or remote purchasers and occupants. 7 When the doctrine of implied
vendors qua builders for property damage. A reprieve came through negligence law, first
in the building contract situation. See note 19 infra. Eventually all purchasers of housing
prior to completion were allowed recovery for injuries to property and persons for
negligently produced homes. See generally Bearman, supra note 2, at 566-70; Roberts,
supra note 2, at 843-46. In some states today, negligence has been used as an ersatz remedy
for post-completion purchasers as well, but these courts still profess allegiance to caveat
emptor. See, e.g., Benson v. Dorger, 33 Ohio App. 2d 110, 292 N.E.2d 919,62 Ohio Op. 2d
176 (1972).
Whenever negligence is employed, however, plaintiff must establish defendant's duty of
care, and as a practical matter many defects may simply be unforeseeable by reasonably
prudent builders. See Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803
(1967). Current implied warranties are not concernedwith these problems, and courts were
reluctant to apply that label to any fact situation meetinganother test until the late 1950's.
See note 17 infra.
16. E.g., Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
17. Products liability was first introduced into the housing market by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in 1965. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,207 A.2d 314 (1965),
involved serious injury, due to a defective hot water system, to the son of a new tenant of the
original purchaser. The court, in a landmark decision, held the mass producer of homes
liable for damages, apparently under strict liability or implied warranty:
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right and just .... Ancient
distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit the law
should be readily rejected .... We consider that there are no meaningful distinctions
between Levitt's mass production and sale of homes and the mass production and
sale of automobiles .... That being so, the warranty orstrict liability principles...
should be carried over into the realty field....
Id. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325. Compare State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.
1966), with Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974).
Traditionally, the housing market was characterized bya high degree of localization and
by relatively small builders who specialized in homes. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
CoMMISSION ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME 113-21 (1968). Larger builders like
Levitt, however, have erected an increasing percentage of the new homes constructed. See
W. KEATING, EMERGING PATTERNS OF CORPORATE ENTRY INTO HOUSING (1973). The
arguments in favor of strict liability and implied warranty are even more persuasive when
defendants supply large quantities of housing to the public. The competing policy
considerations are complex, and fairness demands an assessment of the relative positions
of each party to the transaction. The effect on housing costs needs to be considered also,
preferably by legislatures. See Bearman, supra note 2, at 537-75; cf. Young& Harper, supra
note 4, at 265: "The large scale type of home construction involves commensurately large
lending institutions with the concomitant intricacies of finance and bureaucratic
entanglements of governmental control. It has brought together strange bedfellows....
Each segment has its own potential liability to the consumer.... " See also Yepsen v.
Burgess, 269 Ore. 635, 639-40, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (19,74). Strict liability is potentially
applicable to small as well as large builders, and for less extensive damage. See 47 TEMPLE
1976]
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warranty began to surface in the 1960's, the potential for liability greatly
increased. Once a house was characterized as a "product," and the
transaction as one for the sale of living quarters, new remedies took
shape, nominally labeled contract or tort but based on identical policy
considerations.
Implied warranty cases fall into three categories. x8 First are those in
which the buyer contracts for a home to be built ab initio.19 Often, as in
L.Q. 172, 181 (1973). It has also been helpful to the used home owner, see notes 24, 53-57
and accompanying text infra, and to the first user of a housing component against the
manufacturer or other third parties, see, e.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113
(Miss. 1966).
It is uncertain whether plaintiffs in Pollard, as recent first purchasers, would have
recovered against the builder or vendor under a strict liability theory. The court of appeals
commented that "the relationship of strict liability and implied warranty is close....
[Tlhe warranty formulation adds nothing except the commercial relationship .. "
Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 174, 176 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973). Cf. Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 86-87, 207 A.2d 314,323 (1965); Waggoner v. Midwestern
Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 63-64, 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d
554, 556 (Tex. 1968). See also note 24 infra. "[E]xamination of the case law indicates that a
distinct form of action is emerging which may be known, without reference to contract or
tort, as an action for breach of constructive warranty." Jaeger, supra note 13, at 46. Dean
Prosser has noted that "[t]he seller's warranty is a curious hybrid, born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract, unique in the law." W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 634 (4th
ed. 1971). See also note 28 infra. To date, no vendor who was not also a builder has been
found liable under strict liability.
The trial court had found defendant negligent, and the dissent in the lower court felt
that "[a]ppellants had a fully adequate remedy either in tort or under strict liability. They
slept upon theirrights." Pollardv. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 174,179 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1973). The state supreme court did not deny plaintiffs the possibility of alternative
remedies, although realistically negligence will not be necessary and may not in fact be a
fully adequate substitute. See note 15 supra; cf. Theis v. Heuer, 280 N.E.2d 300 (Ind. 1972),
which allowed both implied warranty and negligence counts to stand. "Although the
evidence may also support a negligence theory, the inquiry in a warranty cause of action
focuses on the adequacy of the final product ... rather than on the reasonableness of
defendant's conduct." Chutich v. Samuelson, 33 Colo. App. 195, _518 P.2d 1363,1366-67
(1973).
18. See Young & Harper, supra note 4, at 253. These categories provide a necessary guide
to understanding judicial thinking. Presently there are 24 jurisdictions recognizing some
sort of implied warranty. From the indications in Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d
466 (Miss. 1974), Mississippi may soon become the twenty-fifth.
19. E.g., Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (Super. Ct. 1970)
(defective fireplace); Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co.,
274 Minn. 17, 143 N.W.2d 622 (1966) (grain elevator collapse due to defects in materials and
design); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958) (sewage
seepage).
Implied warranties in realty were originally found in an occasional construction
contract case in which owner and builder started with a raw piece of land, blueprints and
instructions. For example, in Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884), a
subcontracting bridge company was held to have impliedly warranted that the structure
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the traditional building contract case, the buyer approves plans and
specifications. The first important application of the Miller exception
in the United States involved a case of this type. In Hoye v. Century
Builders, Inc.2 0 the court allowed recovery for damages from sewer
seepage, but noted that the same result would not inure if the home was
purchased subsequent to completion. Purchasers of homes during the
process of construction, the second category, fall within the original fact
pattern of Miller. Recovery is usually permitted under a standard of
reasonably workmanlike quality.2' The third category, homes purchas-
was free from latent defects (careless work on a foundation carried away by a river). Cf.
Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214 N.W.2d 925 (1974). See also note 28 infra. These
implied warranty cases, however, also involved traditional contract issues such as
substantial performance. They were suitable in a limited sense for some home buyers
whose agreements include specifications for materials and labor. The warranty pioneered
by Miller is based upon the proposition that the responsibility for any major housing
defect should rest with the builder-vendor.
20. 52 Wash. 2d 830, 832, 329 P.2d 474, 476 (1958). A year earlier, Ohio became the first
American jurisdiction to consider the Miller rule. In Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio
App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957), the court found an implied warranty in the sale of
uncompleted homes. The rule received wider approval in other jurisdictions, however,
than from the Ohio supreme court. In Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66,218 N.E.2d
594 (1966), the court, sub silentio rejected the use of the "new" implied warranty standard,
opting instead for what appears to be a negligence test, especially its standard of proof.
Behind the court's application of the doctrine of merger, see note 46 infra, may have been a
conservative reluctance to potentially place home builders on the same plane as auto
makers under strict liability. Several jurisdictions, however, have done just that in certain
circumstances. See notes 16-17 supra and note 24 infra. The uncertainties of Mitchem have
led to some confusion in the Ohio appellate courts. One case, Benson v. Dorger, 33 Ohio
App. 2d 110, 292 N.E.2d 919, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 176 (1972), read Mitchem to require a
negligence test. Another, Lloyd v. William Fannin Builders, Inc., 40 Ohio App. 2d507,320
N.E.2d 738,69 Ohio Op. 2d 444 (1973), resulted in a contracts interpretation for Mitchem's
causation test (bearing closer resemblance, however, to the older construction contract
warranty). This hornbook haggling is impeding a clear examination of the policies
behind warranties and delaying the resolution of important questions. Cf. Young &
Harper, supra note 4, at 267-68; 38 Mo. L. REv. 315, 316 n.10.
Washington, on the other hand, subsequently allowed recovery for completed home
purchases based on the policy of preventing shoddy workmanship and allocation of risk.
House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969); accord, Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash.
App. 595, 491 P.2d 1371 (1972).
21. E.g., Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963) (soil conditions);
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (basement flooding); Jones v.
Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963) (defects in foundation). Compare Hanavan v. Dye, 4
Ill. App. 3d 576,281 N.E.2d 398 (1972) (water damage), with Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr.
Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962) (general habitability), and Coutrakon v.
Adams, 39 I1. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963) (faulty boiler causing fire). On its facts,
Hanavan appears to involve a sale of a complete house, but in reaching its conclusion, the
court expressly relies on Weck, a during-construction case, and rejects Coutrakon, which
refused to find an implied warranty except in the construction contract situation in which
specific plans or a model were shown the buyer prior to signing the contract.
1976]
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ed after construction (on the market), was first developed in 1964. In
Carpenter v. Donohoe22 the court allowed recovery to the owner of a
home with a defective wall. It concluded that the Miller classification,
based on the fortuitous timing of the signing of the sales contract, was
meaningless. Thus, "[w]hen justified on the basis that a purchaser
should inspect, caveat emptor does not make much sense with respect to
latent defects, or those defects not discoverable as a practical matter until
the house is occupied and used. ' 23 Pollard falls within this third
category.
California has frequently been in the forefront in extending the
remedies available to housing consumers. In recent years it has applied
the strict liability theory to home builders for serious personal or
property injury.24 In Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan
22. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
23. Haskell, supra note 5, at 640. Since Carpenter, many jurisdictions have found
implied warranties in the sale of completed housing. In Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d I 1 (Fla.
Ct. App.), afj'd, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972), a condominium owner recovered from the
builder-vendor for defects in the air conditioning system. Cf. Weeks v. Slavick Builders,
Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970) (leaky
roof); Hartley v. Ballou, 20 N.C. App. 493, 201 S.E.2d 712 (1974) (water in basement);
Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972) (failure to supply potable water);
Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970) (structural defects in foundation).
These four cases would fit into a different category on their facts. In each one, however, the
court expressly stated that the time of contracting was irrelevant. In Rutledge v.
Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970) (improperly installed sewer system), and
Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) (basement water
damage), caveat emptor was limited to sales of raw land and old buildings. These courts
recognized that as between the builder-vendor and first purchaser, a habitable dwelling
was foremost in the minds of the parties. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)
(fire caused by improper fireplace and chimney construction), and House v. Thornton, 76
Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) (serious foundation defects), exemplify those cases that
have recognized that caveat emptor impedes the strong public policy of preventing shoddy
workmanship and places the risks on the party least able to bear them. Othercases finding
an implied warranty in completed home sales include Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439,252
So. 2d 313 (197 1) (fire damage), overruling Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131
So. 2d 884 (1961); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093,449 S.W.2d 922 (1970) (flooding of floor
ductwork); Theis v. Heuer, 280 N.E.2d 300 (Ind. 1972) (water and sewage backup),
overruling Tudor v. Heugel, 132 Ind. App. 579, 178 N.E.2d 442 (1961); Crawley v.
Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (basement flooding); Smith v. Old Warson
Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (settling of concrete slabs under two rooms); Yepsen v.
Burgess, 269 Ore. 635,525 P.2d 1019 (1974) (improper construction of septic tank and drain
field system), overruling Steiber v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959); Padula v.
J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973) (basement flooding and
appliance defects).
24. The Schipper case, see note 17 supra, was followed in two subsequent California
cases. In Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1969), a house completed in 1951 and sold to the first purchaser in 1952, was bought
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Assoczation25 the court went further and held a lending institution liable
to home buyers for a builder's negligent soil preparation. The builder
had received extensive financial and promotional aid and consultation
from the lending institution. The court was especially concerned with
discouraging shoddy workmanship,26 particularly when defendant
knew or should have known that with reasonable care and timely
inspection the defects could have been obviated. 27
Pollard is the first California case holding that an implied warranty
encompasses defects in construction, regardless of the time of purchase.
Most of the earlier suits brought by homeowners had been grounded in
negligence or implied warranties in building contracts. 28 The Pollard
by plaintiff in 1957. In 1959 the heating system failed due to defective tubing and
defendant, a mass producer of homes, was held strictly liable for property damage. Shortly
thereafter, a land developer and his soil engineer were also held strictly liable to a second
purchaser for defects in filling and grading. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d
607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969). Contra, Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d
466 (Miss. 1974). Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968), while allowing damages for negligent construction, declared that recovery under
strict liability was not possible. Avner and Kriegler did not follow this reasoning.
25. 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).
26. If reliable construction is the norm, the recognition "of a duty on the part of tract
financiers to home buyers should not materially increase the costs of housing.... If
existing sanctions are inadequate, imposition of a duty at the point of effective financial
control... will insure responsible building practices." Id. at 868, 447 P.2d at 618, 73 Cal.
Rptr. at 378. See also Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968). The dissent in
Connor vigorously argued that the power of the purse should not imply any power over
building quality and that the lending of money per se did not cause the harm, but this is a
narrow reading of the facts. In 1969, a statute was enacted providing that lending
institutions will not be liable to third parties such as in Connor "unless such loss or
damage is a result of an act of the lender outside the scope of the activities of a lender of
money, or unless the lender has been a party to misrepresentations." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3434
(Deering 1972). See 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 (1968); cf. Lascher, Lending Institution
Liablity for Defective Home Construction: A Practical Primer, 45 CALIF. ST. B.J. 338
(1970).
27. The court set down criteria to determine whether privity will be waived in a
negligence action. Among the policy factors to balance are the extent defendant's actions
were intended to affect plaintiff, the foreseeability of the harm, the certainty of injury, the
nexus between the conduct and injury (causation), the moral blameworthiness of the
conduct, and the court's desire to prevent future harm. 69 Cal. 2d at865, 447 P.2dat617, 73
Cal. Rptr. at 377.
28. See notes 15, 19 supra. One California court pointed out that a negligent failure to
use ordinary care and skill may be characterized as a tort or breach of warranty. Roscoe
Moss CO. v. Jenkins, 55 Cal. App. 2d 369, 130 P.2d 477 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942). The builder
must prove substantial performance, and plaintiff must show lack of care. Accord,
Kuitems v. Covell, 104 Cal. App. 2d 482, 231 P.2d 552 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951). See Sabella v.
Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21,377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963). In Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d
481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954), Justice Traynor wrote: "[W]arranties have become identified
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court adopted the old and familiar construction contract warranty29 as a
broadbased remedy available to a buyer with a mere sales contract by
characterizing it as "essentially a contract for materials and labor."3 0
The court was impressed by other courts and commentators who had
endorsed such an approach.3' In addition, there were equitable
considerations such as the buyer's reliance and lack of technical
knowledge3 All homebuyers, therefore, should have equal standing to
recover under an implied warranty. 3"
In Pollard, however, defendant asserted that it was a mere developer
rather than a builder-vendor.34 When a plaintiff has purchased a house
from a party other than the builder, many jurisdictions disallow implied
warranty actions against the vendor.3 5 In the more typical case, however,
primarily with ... the sale or furnishing of... chattels ... but they are not confined to
such transactions." Id. at 486, 275 P.2d at 19. This suggestion was employed in Aced v.
Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961), and in
Pollard. Aced found an implied warranty in a construction contract for materials and
labor. The Pollard court also drew support from Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720,321
P.2d 736 (1958), a personal injury case foreshadowing the adoption of strict liability.
29. See note 19 supra.
30. 12 Cal. 3d at 378-79, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
31. The court had no trouble in finding a legal "peg" on which to hang its result in view
of the construction contract warranty. However, the implied warranty for the buyer of a
house after completion is sui generis, and its development was influenced to a large extent
by scholastic commentary. At the time Pollard was decided, the court could point to a
respectable body of authority to buttress its opinion. Id. at 379 & nn.3-4, 525 P.2d at 91 &
nn.3-4, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651 & nn.3-4.
32.
In the setting of the marketplace, the builder or sellerof new construction... makes
implied representations, ordinarily indispensable to the sale, that the builder has
used reasonable skill and judgment .... On the other hand, the purchaser does not
usually possess the knowledge of the builder and is unable to fully examine a
complete house and its components .... Further, unlike the purchaser of an older
building, he has no opportunity to observe how the building has withstood the
passage of time. Thus, he generally relies on those in a position to know ... and his
reliance is surely evident to the construction industry.
Id. at 379, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
33. "Clearly, it would be anomalous to imply a warranty when construction is pursuant
to a contract with the owner - but fail to recognize a similar warranty when the sale
follows completion of construction." Id. at 378-79, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
34. Id. at 376, 525 P.2d at 89, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
35. "[Tlhe rationale... is applicable only against that person who not only had an
opportunity to observe but failed to correct a structural defect, which, in turn, became
latent, i.e., the builder-vendor." Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795,801 (Mo.
1972); see Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Ore. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974); Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin
Homes, Inc., Ill R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973). The lower court dissent in Pollard also
expressed concern with having a seller as a defendant. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co.,
108 Cal. Rptr. 174, 179 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973)(Draper, J., dissenting).
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the builder will also be the vendor. Then, as with third party torts,3 6
plaintiffs usually face no privity obstacles. In California, Connor
removed this barrier in negligence actions against non-vendors. 7 Some
solutions have been found, however, for buyers facing multiple parties
in implied warranty suits. In an action against the latter, one court was
able to characterize a builder as a developer's agent.3. Another tactic has
been to sue both builder and vendor since there is usually ajoint venture
agreement between them.3 9 In Pollard the only remedy apparently open
to plaintiffs was an action against the vendor arising out of the sales
contract.
40
The Pollard court did not consider the possibility of an agency
relationship, but simply concluded that "builders and sellers of new
construction should be held to what is impliedly represented." 4' Pollard
contains an implicit realization that the many companies and
individuals collaborating in the housing industry should not be
immunized from liability merely on the basis of nonprivity or lack of a
common law duty or relationship. 42 When this case is read in
36. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 93.
37. See note 27 supra.
38. Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972). Defendant developer had
subdivided a tract of land and hired a contractor to erect a model unit which plaintiff
purchased. The foundation proved defective.
39. E.g., By thlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d698 (1966) (recovery allowedagainst
a builder, but not the vendor, for damages resulting from water seepage and foundation
defects rendering the basement uninhabitable). See Lambert v. B.&R. Constr. Co., 266 So.
2d 560 (La. Ct. App. 1972); cf. Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (1972).
10. See note 8 supra. Plaintiffs did not make the builder a party to attempt to recover
against either or both as a third party beneficiary of the original agreement between
defendants. Plaintiffs were probably concerned that the applicable statute of limitations
would cover only actual written instruments between parties. See CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §
3371) (Deering 1972). The court might have regarded a suit against the builder as a strict
liability action and barred by the statute of limitations for injuries to property. Id. § 338(2);
see note 17 supra. Even though the problem of proper parties now appears to be moot in
California, an argument can be made that "the builder should be unable to avoid liability
by first selling the house to a commercial vendor. Such a technical requirement of privity
could destroy the purpose of the implied warranty." 38 Mo. L. REv. 315, 320 (1973).
Consider also whether liability could be imposed on a vendor alone who was merely a
conduit for transfer of title.
I1. 12 Cal. 3d at 380, 525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651 (emphasis added).
12..See Young & Harper, supra note 4, at 265; 24 ALA. L. REv. 332, 338 n.29. Pollard
supports its holding by citing, among other cases, Green v. SuperiorCourt, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974), which extends implied covenants to tenants, but
in the course of its lengthy opinion discusses many of the same policy reasons for
abolishing caveat emptor in housing sales. Id. at 622-29,517 P.2d at 1171-76, 111 Cal. Rptr.
at 707-12. For a thorough study of landlord liability see Love, Landlord's Liability for
Defectie Pre mises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19.
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conjunction with Connor and the strict liability cases,4 3 California
courts have clearly indicated that potential liability can extend to
anyone involved in supplying housing to the public. A vendor, for
example, will ordinarily make indispensable representations in the
course of a sale on which the buyer will rely.44 Defendants in Pollard did
more than merely observe the construction.45 Saxe and Yolles were able
to supervise and affect the quality of the finished product, a position
similar to that of the savings and loan company in Connor.
Once implied warranties are recognized, as in Pollard, courts must
still face important unanswered questions. As these issues arise in future
warranty actions, consumers can expect most jurisdictions, including
California, to be sensitive to the potential impact on the housing
market.4 6 This is exemplified by the prevailing evidentiary standard in
such cases: "whether the house is defective is determined by a test of
reasonableness and not perfection." 47 Pollard could not determine in
43. See note 17 supra.
44. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra; note 45 infra. Much the same rationale
that justified the abandonment of the Miller exception (notes 12-14 and accompanying
text supra) in turn supports the individual liability of the vendor. Under traditional caveat
emptor theory, a seller who has not manufactured the goods he is vending is not liable for
defects. See Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108 (1884). The market and legal
milieu that produced this rule bear no significant relationship to the contemporary
housing market.
45. Defendants' involvement in the construction is illustrated by the consultation over
the substitute materials. See note 7 supra. It is possible that the same result would be
reached even without this fact; the vendor qua vendor ipso facto is indispensable and
intimately involved. The court, however, might have scrutinized the relationship between
the builder and vendor. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
46. Some might even refuse to grant recovery against a vendor who cannot also be
characterized as the builder. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. Another defense,
along with caveat emptor, is the doctrine of merger. Any warranties arising out of the sales
contract were said to merge with the deed and expire unless expressly included. Except in
the technical aspects of title transfers, the doctrine of merger also is being abandoned. See,
e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. 1968). Some states, including
California, have statutes excluding warranties in real estate conveyances. These statutes
have usually been interpreted to apply only to title and not to quality or collateral
covenants such as habitability. See Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 2d 374,380
n.5, 525 P.2d 88, 91 n.5,115 Cal. Rptr. 648,651 n.5 (1974); Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc. 24
Mich. App. 621, 628, 180 N.W.2d 503, 507 (1970).
47. Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 33, 298 A.2d 529,532 (1973); accord,
Shippers v. Cunningham Shepard Builders Co., 28 Colo. App. 29, 470 P.2d 593 (1970).
Pollard would seem to adopt this test. 12 Cal. 3d at 380,525 P.2d at 91, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
The terms "minor" and "major" are sometimes used, without precise definition. See
Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476,478,266 A.2d 200,201 (Super. Ct. 1970). But see 38
Mo. L. REv. 315, 319 (1973).
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advance the nature and degree of damage necessary to sustain an implied
warranty action, although if other cases offer a clue, substantial
structural flaws will prove most convincing.4 Some cases have gone
even farther. In one instance, a builder was held liable for soil defects
even though there were no flaws in design or workmanship and a city
engineer had previously inspected the land.49 Building codes have
occasionally been endorsed as a possible source of standards. 0 When
visual inspection by the buyer could have readily disclosed the full
defect, however, the builder-vendor should not, in fairness, be held liable
(absent fraud or misrepresentation). 5'
Another problem left unresolved after Pollard concerns used homes.
California has allowed several suits against original builders for
diminution of property value in strict liability cases, 52 although statutes
of limitation may present some difficulties.5 3 Negligence actions, when
48. Such defects often involve the foundation. See notes 21, 23 supra.
19. House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428,457 P.2d 199 (1969). Cf. Elderkin v. Gaster, 447
Pa. 119, 288 A.2d 771 (1972).
50. See Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 80,388 P.2d 399, 402 (1964). In Schiro v. W.
E. Gould & Co., 18 III. 2d 538, 545, 165 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1960), the court held that
conformance with the building codes is implicit in building construction contracts. The
lower court in Pollard noted that the undersized beams did not comply with the Santa
Clara County Building Code. 108 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
Analogy to the U.C.C. could be helpful. Section 2-314 would require the home site and
dwelling to pass without objection in the trade and be fit for the ordinary purpose for
which it was intended. Section 2-315 would require that the buyer rely on the seller's
-xpertise, and the seller to be aware of this reliance. An express warranty could arise out of
the showing of a model home under § 2-313(1)(c). See Bixby, supra note 14, at 468-69;
Haskell, supra note 5, at 651; Phillips, Recent Developments in the Application of the
Implied Warranty of Fitness for Habitation in the Sale of New Residential Dwellings
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Urban Law Annual).
51. Cf. Hartley v. Ballou, 20 N.C. App. 493, 498, 201 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1974). As
commonsensical as this may sound, courts should follow it with care. The inexperienced
buyer may see a crack in a wall and think little of itat the time, orbe assured by the sellerof
some future remedial steps that fail to materialize. Where to draw the line between a
buyer's honest or excusable oversight, gross carelessness, or stupidity can only be
speculative, and perhaps courts should consider it in calculating damages. See Haskell,
supra note 5, at 653. Pollard required, by analogy to U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a), that the buyer
give the vendor notice within a "reasonable" time to allow defendant a chance to make
repairs, reduce damages, avoid future defects and negotiate settlements. 12 Cal. 3d at 380,
525 P.2d at 92,115 Cal. Rptr. at 652. The lowercourt hadrejected this comparison. 108 Cal.
Rptr. at 178.
52. See note 24 supra.
53. Some courts hold that generally the statute of limitations begins to run from the date
of the wrong, regardless of whether the buyer has discovered the defect. See Avner v.
Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607,77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); cf. U.C.C.
§ 2-725. There is some authority indicating that the period should not commence until
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privity is not necessary, may be available in some states to redress
obvious defects.54 Implied warranties are not usually applied to used
homes,55 and there is some indication in Pollard that California courts
will follow this position.56 Used homes, however, do account for a
significant portion of housing sales, and a more restricted warranty
could be developed, but courts would have to weigh carefully the
potential for disruption of the real estate market.5 7
A good deal of overlap exists in the various remedies available to
buyers, and this has inevitably given rise to some conceptual difficulties
inherent in fashioning new theories in a case-by-case manner. 58 It
discovery, or until a reasonable time after a failure of the builder to repair. See Weeks v.
Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970); Young & Harper, supra
note 4, at 273; 24 ALA. L. REv. 332,339 n.31 (1972). Apparently Pollard is in line with the
latter view, as it refers to the time plaintiffs had "actual and constructive notice of the
damage." 12 Cal. 3d at 377, 525 P.2d at 90, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 650. It is possible that a defect
will not manifest itself until after the passage of a considerable amount of time, as in
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Dist. Ct. App.
1969), or until some natural event occurs such as an extremely heavy rainfall. Cf.
Westwood Dev. Co. v. Esponge, 342 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
54. In Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972), a second
purchaser was allowed to recover for negligent use of faulty plate glass resulting in
personal injury. Strict liability was not to be applied when negligence was clearly present
and the builder was unmistakeably responsible. A claim founded on implied warranty was
rejected because plaintiff was a second purchaser-occupant. See also Waggoner v.
Midwestern Dev. Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 62-63, 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1967).
55. SeeBarnes v. Mac Brown & Co., -Ind. App. - 323 N.E.2d 671(1975); Oliver v. City
Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974); cf. note 50 supra. But see Casavant v.
Campopiano, -R.I. 327 A.2d 831 (1974), in which an intervening tenancy of less than
a year did not immunize a defendant builder from a second (permanent) occupant. The
first occupant's leasehold, which never materialized into an outright sale of the dwelling,
was described as an interim promotional device to aid in locating a buyer.
56. See note 57 infra.
57. Recently, used home warranties have become available commercially. One program
insures against defects for 18 months after the company's inspection. Information can be
obtained from the Certified Home Inspection Program, 200 Century Plaza, Suite 333,
Columbia, Md. 21044. For commercial new home warranties, see note 62 infra. See also
Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 18 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972): "We ponder, but do not decide, what
result would occur if more remote purchasers were involved. We recognize that liability
must have an end but question the creation of any artificial limits of either time or
remoteness to the original purchaser." The arguments in favor of used home liability are
strongest in the case of the merchant-vendor, although a few writers wouldgo further. See
Bixby, supra note 14, at 474-75; cf. Haskell, supra note 5, at 650-52. Pollard hinted that
there are different policy considerations involved in the purchase of used homes, see note
31 supra, but did not specify what they were. A few cases do grant the used home buyer
relief for the seller's failure to disclose the presence of termite infestation when the seller
had knowledge. See 22 A.L.R.3d 972 (1968).
58. See note 17 supra. For example, when privity is not necessary, implied warranties,
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remains unresolved, however, whether legislatures should provide a
single method for recovery in place of judicially fashioned remedies. 59
To some extent these problems are being settled as more jurisdictions
enunciate a clear implied warranty action as in Pollard, rather than
continuing to stretch tort remedies. Nevertheless, uncertainty will
continue to exist for the builder. He may have to bear responsibility for
nonstructural defects 60 or even used homes he has built.6' Pollard
demonstrates that even as a mere developer, the housing entrepreneur is
not immune. These risks may extend over long periods of time if a defect
does not surface soon after construction. 62 Perhaps even express
disclaimers will be ineffective, especially when the unsuspecting buyer
did not notice or fully understand it.6 As Pollard indicates, a
homeowner who has given the vendor (or builder) notice of the
condition need only prove the existence of an "unreasaonble" defect at
the time of the sale. With the imposition of liability on a vendor who was
contractually bound to the builder, California courts seem to be
continuing the process, begun in Connor, of holding virtually anyone
strict liability and negligence have been variously utilized, depending on the identity of the
parties or the case law of the particular jurisdiction. See notes 16, 24, 39 supra; notes25-26
and accompanying text supra.
59. Commentators have made several proposals for reform. One proposed act imposes a
greater liability on merchant builders and vendors, and limits the recovery against
nonmerchant sellers to defects actually known but not disclosed. The statute of limitations
is only one year. Bearman, supra note 2, at 575-78. Professor Haskell suggests a warranty
for all new construction regardless of the seller's expertise. Some reservations are suggested
in the sale of used housing, and the statute of limitations would be five years (one year for
used housing). Haskell, supra note 5, at 651-52. Another approach, preserving the tort and
contract pigeonholes, see Roberts, supra note 2, at 866-67, contrasts with Young &
Harper's proposal, which suggests the label "realtability" for their "new" implied
warranty. Young & Harper, supra note 4, at 267. For a review of the English solutions see
North, Defective Premises Act 1972,36 MODERN L. REv. 628 (1973). See also notes 47-52 and
accompanying text supra.
60. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
61. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
62. See note 53 supra. One way a builder can minimize risks in selling new homes is to
participate in a commercial warranty program. The only one currently offered in the
United States is by the Home Owners Warranty Corporation. The builder is financially
obligated for two years. Eight more years coverage is provided by an insurance plan. The
scope of protection varies somewhat over the ten years, and the insurance plan would
assume responsibility for the builder in the first two years if the latter should default.
Arbitration and conciliation are provided for in the event of a dispute, and no remedies
under the law are taken away. Information can be obtained from Home Owners Warranty
Corporation, National Housing Center, 15th and M. Sts., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005.
63. See Sallinger v. Mayer, 304 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App. 1974); cf. Casavant v.
Campopiano, - R.I. -, 327 A.2d 831 (1974).
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liable who is intimately connected with supplying homes to the public.
The task that lies ahead is to enunciate with greater precision the
meaning of "reasonable workmanship" and to determine what class of
plaintiffs beyond the first new home consumer the law will protect.
James J. Knappenberger
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